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Abstract : Recently, for many health economics researchers, empirical estimation
of the monetary valuation of a quality-adjusted life year (QALY) has become an
important endeavour. Different philosophical and practical approaches to this
have emerged. On the one hand, there is a view that, with health-care budgets
set centrally, decision-making bodies within the system can iterate, from
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observation of a series of previous decisions, towards the value of a QALY,
thus searching for such a value. Alternatively, and more consistent with the
approach taken in other public sectors, individual members of the public are
surveyed with the aim of directly eliciting a preference-based – also known as a
willingness-to-pay-based (WTP-based) – value of a QALY. While the former is
based on supply-side factors and the latter on demand, both in fact suffer from
informational deficiencies. Sole reliance on either would necessitate an acceptance
or accommodation of chronic inefficiencies in health-care resource allocation. On
the basis of this observation, this paper makes the case that in order to approach
optimal decision making in health-care provision, a framework incorporating
and thus, to a degree, reconciling these two approaches is to be preferred.
Introduction
The question of the value to place on a quality-adjusted life year (QALY) has
existed for some time in the health economics literature, notably since some
authors sought to make the (controversial) link between cost-effectiveness
analysis (CEA) and cost–benefit analysis (CBA; Phelps and Mushlin, 1991).
More recently, the same question has come to the fore in policy circles through
the creation of health technology assessment (HTA) agencies around the world.
In making one-off recommendations about adoption or otherwise of an eval-
uated therapy, such agencies are, in effect, placing a monetary value on health
gains. In the context of England and Wales, the National Institute for Health
and Clinical Excellence (NICE) uses the QALY as its health metric. By operating
with a threshold value of a QALY, above which an evaluated therapy is less
likely to be recommended for adoption by the rest of the National Health
Service (NHS), NICE is effectively setting the maximum price it will pay for, and
thus the value it places on, a marginal QALY gained. Another way of looking at
this is that the threshold represents NICE’s estimate of the opportunity cost (or
again the value of) services displaced at the margin by recommended technologies
(National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2004).
Criticism of NICE as to the lack of an empirical basis for its current threshold
has led to a recent and somewhat heated debate about how such a value should
be arrived at. A natural starting point might be to adopt, at least in spirit, the
standard economic approach to identify the value of any goods or services,
which is to look at the equilibrium between demand and supply or, more spe-
cifically, the quantity (and associated price) at which marginal benefit equals
marginal cost (MC). This is important, as it highlights the fact that for a ‘true’
value and hence optimum quantity of health care to be identified, decision
makers such as NICE would in fact require information concerning both the
supply and demand sides of the ‘market’. Unfortunately, because no market
exists for health care or QALYs, we cannot simply observe this value and instead
research methods have been developed with the aim of eliciting the value or
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cost of a QALY with a view to informing the NICE threshold.1 Two main
approaches have been advocated for obtaining a money value or cost per QALY,
each essentially addressing the question from different sides of the ‘market’.
In the next section of this paper, we describe these two approaches in more detail
and define those operating from the demand side as ‘surveyors’ and those from the
supply side as ‘searchers’. While it may be tempting to regard these two perspectives
as alternatives – or even rivals – in this paper we will argue that they are essentially
complementary and that to rely exclusively on one or the other will, in the long run,
almost certainly result in a sub-optimal allocation of society’s scarce resources.
Thus, not only would we advocate a truce between searchers and surveyors, but
would, indeed, suggest that both groups recognise that they are in fact fighting for
the same cause! This should not be taken to imply that both should ultimately arrive
at the same value for a QALY. We are agnostic as to how close or far apart they are
or ‘should be’ and are not trying to impose an empirical relationship or validation
of any theoretical link between NHS budget constraints and willingness-to-pay
(WTP)-based values, as it is highly questionable whether such a link exists in theory.
After outlining what we mean by demand and supply in this context, we build
on the theoretical framework put forward by Culyer et al. (2007) and present a
formal exposition of the issues in an effort to outline such a reconciliation.
Then, we address some recent criticisms levelled at surveyors’ methods and
highlight the methodological challenges faced by both approaches. Such a
response is necessary because not only is it important to address such criticisms
but also, in doing so, issues emerge that direct us towards a forward-looking
reconciliation of the perspectives.
Before proceeding, it is worth pointing out that there are also ongoing debates
as to whether there is indeed a single value of a QALY ‘out there’ waiting to be
discovered (Brouwer et al., 2008) and whether we should weigh QALYs according
to the characteristics of who is gaining them (Dolan et al., 2008; Baker et al.,
2010). Similarly, we recognise that there are considerable challenges in estimating
a WTP-based value of a QALY, as proposed by the surveyors (Pinto-Prades et al.,
2009; Baker et al., 2010; Smith and Sach, 2010). Although these are clearly
matters of considerable importance, this paper takes as its focus the recent
discussion of issues of principle in arriving at some sort of ‘baseline’ value and the
presentation of a formal, theoretical framework, which enables reconciliation of
issues with respect to that.
1 It could be argued, of course, that markets exist for health-producing items such as over-the-counter
(OTC) pharmaceuticals and that these promise QALY gains. However, challenges in arriving at a value of a
QALY through data from such markets would face challenges at least equivalent to the contingent valuation
methods we go on to discuss in this paper. Among others, the health gains bought are done so in very specific
circumstances, not necessarily under conditions that reveal maximum willingness to pay, and many assump-
tions would have to be made about how the health gains being purchased translate into QALYs. Indeed,
attempts at assessing ‘value’ in the OTC context often revert to contingent valuation methods (Lamiraud et al.,
2009). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that other routes to the value(s) of a QALY exist.
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Demand- and supply-side perspectives on valuing a QALY
The first approach, used by those we refer to as ‘surveyors’, is grounded solely
on the demand side and focuses on the marginal benefits of a QALY. It assesses,
through survey research, the WTP of members of the public for (typically small)
health gains. These sums are then aggregated to arrive at an estimate of the overall
value of a QALY. This approach is clearly in line with the general approach taken
to CBA in the rest of the UK public sector, and, indeed, was used in a recent
survey with respect to monetary valuation of a QALY funded by the Department
of Health and undertaken in the United Kingdom (Baker et al., 2010).
Those referred to in what follows as the ‘searchers’ have argued vigorously
that bodies, such as NICE, should not elicit values from the public but should
instead act as a ‘threshold-searcher’, seeking to identify the optimal threshold of
incremental cost per QALY gained within the limits of expenditure set by the
government (Culyer et al., 2007; McCabe et al., 2008). Hence, this approach
can be thought of as being focused solely on the supply side of the ‘market’.2
This search for a threshold would involve examination of past decisions taken
by local NHS entities, such as primary care trusts (PCTs; Martin et al., 2008;
Appleby et al., 2009). By identifying the price/cost of QALYs gained from
interventions implemented and those lost by services displaced, the values of
QALYs implied by such decisions can be inferred and compared with the NICE
threshold, leading, presumably, to negotiations over what the ‘optimal’ value
might be – although the process for determining optimality is unclear. In some
senses, without NICE and PCTs negotiating over what the value of a QALY
might be, it could be argued that the NICE threshold is just as problematic as a
WTP-based one.
In building towards a conceptual framework, it is important to note here that
we are not advocating a solely demand-side approach in which all health pro-
jects for which WTP is greater than the cost be implemented. In other parts of
the public sector, imposed budget constraints mean that, in actual fact, WTP
values are used to rank projects in order of net benefit. This requires knowledge
of the benefit and cost curves faced by PCTs so as to maximise value from the
budget, which implies that both demand- and supply-side approaches to the
NICE threshold would be relevant.
Reconciling the issues between searching and surveying:
a framework
Moving towards an alternative conceptual framework requires a shift in focus.
Rather than viewing the two analytical perspectives as vying for supremacy,
instead they should be seen as essentially complementary.
2 By ‘supply side,’ we mean the whole of the NHS and setting to one side (for the purposes of this
discussion) the internal or quasi-market in operation within the NHS in England.
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By way of explanation, consider Figure 1 in which the quantity of health care,
Q, is plotted on the horizontal axis and the corresponding total cost, C, of
providing each overall level of health care – as well as the total benefit, B,
associated with that level of provision – are plotted on the vertical axis.
By the standard type of welfare economics argument, provided that the value,
V, per unit of health care (e.g. per QALY) has been defined on an aggregate WTP
basis (possibly with distributional weights applied), then the total benefit
associated with any level of provision, Q, will be given simply by VQ, so that
the graph of total benefit (B) will be a straight line through the origin.3 In turn,
on the assumption that the marginal cost of health-care provision is increasing,
then the graph of the total cost function (C) will be increasing and convex. In the
absence of any imposed public expenditure constraints, the optimal level of
health-care provision will be at Q* where marginal cost equals marginal benefit
(or the gradient of B5 the gradient of C).
However, suppose that a constraint is imposed which requires that total
expenditure on health-care provision during the period concerned should not
exceed C. The constrained optimum level of health-care provision for this period
will then be given by Q. In addition, suppose that health care is provided by a
number of different health-care authorities (as is in fact typically the case) and
that none of these authorities have full information concerning the total cost
function. In spite of this, the constrained optimum will still be achievable pro-
vided that the central health-care authority permits the local authorities to
B=VQC
Q* Quantity of
health care
B,C (£)
Gradient = MCC
Q
Figure 1. ‘Finding’ a value of a quality-adjusted life year.
3 It might be argued that for large variations in Q it would be necessary to recognise that with
diminishing marginal utility of health care, the graph of total benefit would be increasing and strictly
concave. However, for more modest variations in Q of the type under consideration in this paper, the
assumption of at least local linearity seems entirely reasonable. In any case, strict concavity of the total
benefit function would not alter the essence of the argument that follows.
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supply a service if and only if the marginal cost of doing so is less than or equal
to the marginal cost, MC, corresponding to Q. This is essentially the searchers’
approach. Alternatively, if the WTP-based value, V, per unit of health care is a
multiple, k (.1), of MC, then the local authorities could simply be required to
provide a service only if its marginal benefit/cost ratio was greater than or equal
to k. This is to all intents and purposes the essence of the surveyors’ approach.
But, of course, in order to apply either of these two approaches, the central
health-care authority must have adequate information concerning the nature of
the cost function before issuing its guidelines to the local authorities. If it does
not have this information at the beginning of the planning period, but instead
faces a situation in which possible health-care projects will simply ‘crop-up’ at
various stages of the period concerned, then the constrained optimum will
simply be achievable only by chance. More specifically, without previous
information concerning the properties of the total cost function it would be
impossible to determine the critical ‘cut-off’ level, MC, of marginal cost so that
the searchers’ approach would be a non-starter.4 Similarly, even if the magnitude
of the WTP-based value, V, per unit of health-care service was well established,
without previous knowledge of MC it would be impossible to specify an
appropriate cut-off benefit/cost ratio, k.
Hence without previous knowledge of MC, the constrained optimum would,
to all intents and purposes, be an unachievable ideal, both for searchers and
surveyors. However, how then might the central health authority proceed? One
possibility would be to rely on educated guesswork concerning the magnitude
of MC based on past experience, without any reference to the magnitude (or
indeed the nature) of V. Alternatively, local health authorities could simply be
informed about the level of V and instructed to consider only those proposed
activities whose marginal cost of provision fell below this level and, so far as
possible, to give priority to those activities with the lowest marginal cost.
Which of these two ‘third-best’ solutions should central health-care authorities
adopt in practice? Our argument is essentially that, applied in isolation, each
approach suffers from serious potential shortcomings but that if, by contrast, the
two approaches are applied in parallel, as it were, then most of the more serious
difficulties can be avoided.
As far as the potential shortcomings of each approach are concerned, suppose
first that based on a ‘search’ of past decisions an educated guess is made con-
cerning the appropriate level at which to set the cut-off marginal cost, MC.
Given that we are dealing with a situation in which the unconstrained optimum
4 At this point, it is worth noting a further, and potentially severe but generally overlooked, problem
that is specific to the ‘searchers’ approach. As well as being based on imperfect information with respect
to costs, a necessary assumption for implementation is that cost functions are stable over time and
continuous. In effect, we assume that the past is a good proxy for the present and the future. This seems,
at the very least, contestable. For example, inflation and innovation, among other things, will have had a
significant impact on health-care provision costs. To ignore this feature is worrying.
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is unachievable, it will necessarily be the case that MC is less than V. However if
V is not known (or at least information concerning the magnitude of V is not in
the public domain), then it will be perfectly understandable if the press and
media – and hence the general public – come to regard MC as the ‘value’ that the
central authority places on a unit of health care. The recent heated controversy
over the implicit value placed on potential treatment for terminally ill cancer
patients is a clear example. A further and arguably far more serious potential
consequence of focusing exclusively on MC and ignoring V is that central
government decisions concerning the appropriate size of the overall health-care
budget may be adversely influenced by the mistaken belief on the part of at least
some key decision makers that MC constitutes the appropriate measure of the
marginal benefit of health care, with a resultant serious undervaluation of
the latter in the overall allocation of public expenditure. Indeed, even if the size
of the health-care budget is taken as given, there remains the possibility of a
misallocation of the budget if the focus is exclusively on MC. Thus, if – as many
would argue ought to be the case – the overall benefits of health-care provision
are defined sufficiently widely to include other effects such as time saving or the
convenience of patients and their visitors (see e.g. Broome, 2004: 261), then
there is clearly a danger that health improvement per se will tend to be under-
provided relative to these other benefits if it is valued on the basis of MC,
without any reference to its ‘true’ value, V.
By contrast, suppose that no attempt is made to estimate MC but that instead
local health-care agencies are informed only about the level of V. While application
of this value in the assessment of proposed health-care programmes will ensure that
no treatments with a negative net social benefit will be undertaken, it is still possible
that many programmes having a marginal cost in excess of MC – and hence lying in
the interval [Q, Q*] in Figure 1 – will be (sub-optimally) undertaken.
However, if local health-care authorities are provided with a ‘best estimate’ of
MC and the level of V is clearly established and widely publicised, then the
problems just outlined will be largely, if not entirely, avoided. These are precisely
the grounds on which we would argue that the searchers’ and the surveyors’
approaches should be regarded as being essentially complementary rather than
competing allocative tools.
Responding to the case against the surveyors
At this point, it would seem to be important to examine the case made against the
use of WTP-based values in the health-care context, the demand-side concept
advocated by the surveyors. While WTP-based values are now used extensively in
public sector allocative and regulatory decision making (particularly in the context
of transport, air pollution reduction and nuclear power generation), there are
informational imperfections and potential weaknesses in the approach. Objections
to the WTP approach would appear to revolve around three issues.
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WTP and ability to pay
The first objection is that WTP is associated with ability to pay. It is then natural
to think that defining the value of a QALY in terms of individual WTP would
result in higher values for the better-off and lower values for those on lower
incomes. This is not a criticism that has been made by recent searchers, but is
rather a more impressionistic and common criticism, which nevertheless finds its
way into the more formal literature from time to time. A good example is the
following quote from the authors of the Washington Panel Guidelines on Cost
Effectiveness:
Cost–benefit analysis’s primary valuation method is willingness to pay (WTP), an
approach whose difficulty lies in its intrinsic favouring of the programs and diseases of
the affluent over those of the poor.
(Gold et al., 1996)
The searchers’ solution to this is to have decisions made on the basis of QALYs
gained for resources invested or equivalently, cost per QALY-gained, the
implication being that such an approach is value free with respect to unpleasant
distributional considerations. This strategy, however, seems to ignore the fact
that it has also been shown that QALYs are subject to the same distributional
challenges as WTP (Donaldson et al., 2002), the solution for which is the same:
to average stated utility values across populations.
Nevertheless, it is incumbent on surveyors to address this issue specifically in
respect of a WTP-based value. Noting, as above, distributional problems asso-
ciated with a QALY-based value may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. To be
clear, the aim of asking a cross-section of the population about their WTP is to
obtain a value that takes proper account of the preferences and wishes of
members of the public, as well as society’s overall budget constraint. Advocates
of the WTP approach, the surveyors, would tend to argue for one value, based
on some measure of central tendency, to be applied to each member of society
regardless of income. Indeed, public sector agencies that use such values (for
example, the Department for Transport) invariably do apply the same value to
all income groups once that value has been calculated by averaging across the
population. Recent advances in the safety economic literature have provided an
economic theoretic foundation for this previously ad hoc, but arguably fair,
approach to policymaking (Baker et al., 2008). Such a measure of central ten-
dency is crucial to the more formal framework set out above.
Detachment from the budgetary process
The second argument, and the main one made by the searchers, is that, as the
NHS budget is set through negotiation between the Treasury and the Department
of Health, individual WTP values have no relevance for health service resource
allocation as they are somehow detached from the budget-setting process. This
has led to the stated view that
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information about how much an individual or society values improvements in health
(i.e. their willingness to pay for a QALY) is not at all relevant to the NICE remit.
(Culyer et al., 2007, p. 57)
This is a strong argument, but it can be countered in three ways. The first and
most important point is that in a democratic society there is a powerful case to
be made for ensuring that the government’s budget-setting process should, so far
as possible, be fully informed about the preferences and attitudes of members
of the public. Thus, while it is reasonable to expect that negotiations between
the Treasury and the Department of Health will take account of a number of
different factors, information concerning the public’s WTP for health care
should arguably constitute an important consideration, the role that information
could play having been outlined more formally above.
Second, NICE can be subjected to the same criticism of being detached from
the NHS budget as that levelled at the surveyors. NICE does not have a budget,
and PCTs constantly complain about decisions being imposed upon them from
NICE. Such complaints, if valid, would mean that the current threshold is
leading to a misallocation of NHS resources which, ultimately, means we are
getting less health for our tax £s spent.
A third consideration is that, while surveyors’ values may be detached from
the budgetary process, searcher values are in fact too attached. There is a self-
fulfilling prophecy (more formally, path-dependency) to the process whereby
NICE searches for a threshold through a series of decisions it has already made.
One would predict that the value to emerge from this process is likely to be
around the threshold range of £20k–30k per QALY, precisely because this is the
value at which NICE already operates! The literature abounds with examples of
decision-makers’ judgements leading to great variation in values of lives saved
(Mooney, 1984). It may well be that £20k–30k is the correct range because it
was made on the basis of intelligent guesses by experts at NICE’s outset.
However, we can never know whether this is the case or whether there is a path
dependency towards the range because that is what is now ‘out there’. Indeed,
the influence of the stated threshold range on decisions has already been
demonstrated in the literature (Devlin and Parkin, 2004).
A threat to the Constitution?
The WTP approach has been depicted as a threat to the constitutional jur-
isdiction of Parliament! The argument put forward by threshold-searchers is
that survey-based WTP approaches somehow substitute the ‘direct democracy’
of public opinion for the parliamentary process through which the Treasury and
Department of Health agree a budget for the NHS, within which PCTs and
NICE have to work (Culyer et al., 2007). It is claimed that ‘experimental
methods’ (i.e. WTP studies) cannot capture the opportunity costs more effec-
tively than Parliament as the budget-setting process for the NHS takes account
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of assessments of the marginal value of extensions of a wide range of public
programmes and of the value of purchasing power left in the pockets of consumers
(McCabe et al., 2008).
The simple answer to this is to ask what can be more legitimate than seeking
to determine what those who stand to gain or lose from different allocations of
NHS resources – that is, the public – think should count, not least as these
resources are ultimately paid for by the public, that is taxpayers, themselves.
(NICE does this anyway, as the quality-of-life ‘tariff’ that it uses to calculate the
cost per QALY of interventions is based on a survey of the general public.) We
would also contend that, beyond a single value of a QALY, information is
needed regarding the relative value of QALYs made up largely of improvements
in quality of life vis-a`-vis those emanating from survival gains, and that the
only legitimate way of doing this (and of avoiding politicians and decision-
makers being criticised for the decisions made) is to establish more thoroughly
the preferences of the public as regards different types of health gain – an issue
that has grown in importance with the emergence of value-based pricing in
England as the bulk of this paper was written. As we have already noted,
we do not regard information concerning the public’s WTP for health care as
being the only relevant input in the NHS allocative decision-making process,
but we do believe that it constitutes an important consideration. Furthermore, if,
in its budget-setting, Parliament has already taken account of the purchasing
power left in the pockets of consumers, the gap between a value of a QALY
inferred from WTP surveys of the public and from NHS decisions might not be
that great.
Outstanding methodological challenges in developing a new
framework for QALY valuation
Having digressed somewhat to defend the use of WTP-based values in health-
care decision making, it is important to return to our main objective of recon-
ciliation. Both surveyors and searchers face significant challenges in designing
and executing research that delivers reliable demand and supply side informa-
tion. For surveyors, these challenges concentrate around issues that have been
discussed for some time in the economics literature, such as overcoming framing
effects and insensitivity of responses to small changes in scale, and which have
also come to light in recent value-of-a-QALY research (Pinto-Prades et al.,
2009). Methodological issues that are perhaps more specific to the pursuit of
WTP per QALY include questions regarding the aggregation of individual ratios
(Baker et al., 2010), appropriate measures of central tendency and the effect on
elicited values of ‘non-traders’ in either health or wealth domains.
Threshold-searchers face different challenges. Examining investment and
disinvestment decisions made by PCTs in order to establish the cost per QALY
at the margin is one way of searching for a threshold value. If, for example,
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disinvestments made by PCTs were associated with a lower cost per QALY than
recommendations made by NICE, it would imply that the threshold is too high.
However, the idea that PCTs can somehow iterate towards such a value would
seem to be rather farfetched at the moment. To date, in the NHS, no systematic
framework for commissioning, which recognises scarcity and can explicitly
address tradeoffs, has been implemented. We know this as health economists
who have done more than most in terms of working with the NHS on trying to
improve its decision-making processes (Bate et al., 2007). It would seem that the
development of such a framework is essential for matching national priorities
with local needs and to provide local health organisations with a defensible
mechanism for (occasionally) justifying a focus on the local as well as the
national agenda. When in place, perhaps we could iterate towards the value of a
QALY at the margin. However, only a few years ago, the Health Committee of the
UK House of Commons stated that practical systems and structures should be put
in place to improve capacity to implement guidance, as implicit prioritisation is
insufficient, and the Government must work towards ‘‘a comprehensive frame-
work for health-care prioritisation, underpinned by an explicit set of ethical and
rational values to allow the relative costs and benefits of different areas of NHS
spending to be comparatively assessed in an informed way’’. The more recent
assessment of PCTs, through the World Class Commissioning initiative, would
seem to show little movement towards this ideal.
Appleby et al. (2009), in their recent and admirable quest, state that ‘‘a
definitive finding about the consistency or otherwise of NICE and NHS cost-
effectiveness thresholds would require very many decisions to be observed,
combined with a detailed understanding of the local decision-making pro-
cesses’’. The most rigorous valuations from the searchers to date are those of
Martin et al. (2008) who attempted to estimate what it costs the NHS in
England to produce a QALY in the programme areas of cancer and circulatory
disease; arriving at values of £11,960 and £19,070, respectively. However, the
authors recognise that these can only be regarded as very rough estimates and
the availability of high-quality data on which to base estimations of QALYs (as
opposed to mortality estimates) is limited.
Even if robust cost per QALY figures could be estimated for all 23 programme
areas within the National Programme Budgeting Dataset for England, it is likely
that costs will vary widely. It is also well known that costs for some conditions,
such as heroic treatment for neuroblastoma, are in excess of £120,000 per
QALY gained. Identification of such a range is useful, but it is not clear how
much further, compared with other approaches, it gets us towards validating or
querying the NICE threshold. Strictly, they tell us the costs (and not value) of
producing a QALY in different treatment circumstances. If some of these costs
are as high as for neuroblastoma, information on the public’s WTP for a QALY,
both in absolute terms and (as yet, little researched) on how WTP across the
range of more-heroic to more-routine scenarios varies, would be useful.
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Given the uncertainties involved in empirical approaches based on all the
methods outlined above, it would seem sensible to articulate all of them within
one framework that can show how a value can be ‘triangulated’ from the NICE
threshold, NHS costs of producing a QALY and the public’s WTP for a QALY.
What is needed now?
In order for a framework based on the two approaches to be developed, it
requires acceptance on each ‘side’ that information deficiencies will continue to
persist, both in respect of supply and demand factors; to rely solely on one
method almost certainly delivers inefficient health-care resource allocation. If
this premise is accepted, then there is a chance to progress towards a framework
that embraces both, maximising the information available to decision makers.
Many other considerations will of course be overlaid on this basic position but it
seems a reasonable place to start given the highly challenging question being
addressed.
Practically, as results become available from further refined surveys of the
public’s WTP and improved observations of NICE and PCT decisions, we can
then begin to speak in more informed ways about the size of the QnQ gap. As
we have stated, we are agnostic about its magnitude, but we noted above that
the number(s) arising from the surveyors’ research may not be as far from the
search-based ones as might be speculated.
Despite the work that has been started, what is now required is more in-depth
survey research on the public’s views on the value they might attach to the
different ways QALYs can be generated and on the relative importance that
might be given to the characteristics of potential beneficiaries of NHS services.
Research to encourage improved and more systematic decision making by PCTs
would also help as would that using routinely collected data on expenditures
and outcomes, and, eventually, would permit reasoned comparison with the
views of the public. Then, as well as observing the size of the QnQ gap, we can
also have a more reasoned debate on what, if anything, to do about it.
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